Shanghai Yuanxin Satellite Technology Co., Ltd., the Chinese operator of the Qianfan Constellation, sent 18 more satellites into orbit on November 3 aboard a Lijian-2 carrier rocket that lifted off at 8:15 from the Jiuquan Dongfeng Commercial Aerospace Innovation Pilot Zone, according to 36Kr. The launch — the constellation’s 11th this year — took Qianfan to 274 satellites in orbit, 50 short of the 324 the company has said it needs before it opens commercial service to the world.
Key facts
- Yuanxin Satellite chief executive Shen Hongbo said publicly in June that the constellation would finish networking its 324-satellite first phase by the end of this year, serve the whole world and begin commercial operation.
- Clearing the remaining 50-satellite gap at 18 satellites per launch implies at least three more flights in the final weeks of the year — starlink-news’s own arithmetic from 36Kr’s figures, not a number the outlet states. 36Kr says there is no public information on whether all three are scheduled.
- Qianfan satellites have received space radio station licences and frequency use permits from China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology in batches.
- Yuanxin Satellite completed a capital increase of 6.976 billion yuan in August.
How much of that can be checked from outside China? The reporting chain is narrow — 36Kr relaying The Economic Observer — and Yuanxin Satellite publishes no running in-orbit tally, so starlink-news has not independently confirmed the 274-satellite count or the capital increase. Two of the most quotable judgements in that chain come from people the original reporting does not identify: “a technology analyst at a large South China brokerage” and an investor described only as having long followed commercial aerospace. Neither is traceable from the published text, and their figures should be read as the estimates they are. The launch record itself is externally verifiable: each Qianfan batch is catalogued from US Space Force tracking data in public orbital databases such as Jonathan McDowell’s General Catalog of Artificial Space Objects, so anyone can count the flights even when the operator publishes no total. The regulatory claims can also be read at source rather than taken on description.
Why it matters
Qianfan is one of two Chinese satellite internet systems each planned at more than 10,000 satellites, and 36Kr frames the coming weeks as a test of whether a state-backed challenger can move from launching capacity to selling it. The gap with the incumbent is wide: SpaceX launched Starlink service in 2020, six years before Qianfan’s planned commercial start, and last week Starlink reported 13.6 million subscriptions and about 11,100 satellites.
What the ITU rule actually says
36Kr’s deadline argument rests on International Telecommunication Union rules, which it paraphrases as a late constellation having its frequency and orbit resources reduced accordingly. That rule is real and public: under Resolution 35, adopted at the 2019 World Radiocommunication Conference and published with the Radio Regulations by the ITU’s space services department, a non-geostationary system must have 10 percent of its satellites in place within two years of the end of its bringing-into-use period, 50 percent within five years and the full number within seven — and an operator that misses a milestone has its recorded constellation cut to the number it actually deployed. Those clocks run from each filing’s own dates, which are not public here. The end-of-year 324 figure is therefore Yuanxin Satellite’s commercial promise rather than an ITU cliff edge, a distinction the 36Kr account does not draw.
No price has been set — and that is Brazil’s question
Judging from public progress, 36Kr reports, ordinary consumers in China cannot use Qianfan services for the time being. The outlet names Brazil as the leading landing market — already the largest market for SpaceX’s Starlink outside the United States — and does not identify any other country where Qianfan plans to sell service. Brazil’s National Telecommunications Agency, Anatel, approved Qianfan’s local operation in February but cleared 324 satellites rather than the 648 Yuanxin applied for, 36Kr reports, and on October 19 a Qianfan user terminal passed Anatel certification. The agency publishes satellite exploitation rulings in the Diário Oficial and in its own public records; the February act number is absent from the 36Kr report, and starlink-news has not retrieved it. The Brazilian groundwork predates both decisions — Reuters reported in November 2024 that Yuanxin Satellite had signed an agreement with the state-owned carrier Telebras.
What none of it settles is price. Neither the 36Kr report nor the Yuanxin executives quoted in it put a figure on a Qianfan subscription or user terminal, or name a target download speed, so there is nothing to set against Starlink’s published Brazilian tariffs — and in a market where the incumbent already sells retail through a dealer network, price is the first variable a challenger has to answer. Yuanxin’s public commitments cover coverage and timing only.
An investor who has long followed the commercial aerospace market told The Economic Observer that the first stop for the Chinese version of Starlink is most likely a market where the American system has already taken the lead. The same investor put the distinction bluntly: “Launch solves the problem of whether there is capacity, while commercialization needs to answer who to sell the capacity to and how much can be sold.”
Three launches, one month
Xu Yunxiang, a vice president at Yuanxin Satellite, said in July that the aim was to accumulate 324 satellites in orbit within the year, build supporting ground systems, achieve global basic coverage and be able to offer preliminary commercial services to downstream customers.
Whether the hardware arrives in time depends on launch slots. 36Kr reports that the number of launches at China’s major commercial launch sites this year has significantly exceeded last year’s total, that twice-monthly launches from a single site have become normal, and that this is expected to rise to three times a month next year. But it also reports that site schedules for this year and next are almost fully booked, that new launch demand is being pushed to the year after next, that some newly built sites have launch capability yet no launches booked this year because of rocket development progress, and that a new rocket type entering a site for the first time usually needs two to three months of running-in.
‘Launch, measurement and control resources are tight’
Zhang Qi, chairman of Yuanxin Satellite, said during the National Two Sessions in March that high-power, recyclable low-cost rockets remain at the experimental stage and that launch, measurement and control resources are tight, which cannot fully meet the needs of rapid networking for giant constellations. Launch risk is not unique to China — this month a Vulcan failure destroyed 40 satellites belonging to another Starlink rival.
A target that has already slipped
Even 324 satellites is not the end point. Hu Haiying, chief commander of the Qianfan satellite system, wrote publicly in January that fully realising commercialisation would require doubling that number. Under Yuanxin Satellite’s public plan from 2024, those 648 satellites were originally due to launch by the end of 2025 — but only 108 were actually in orbit by then, according to 36Kr.
The rest of China’s buildout
The other Chinese system is the GW Constellation, built by China Satellite Network Group Co., Ltd., known as China StarNet. 36Kr reports that the GW Constellation has launched 12 groups of satellites this year, most recently on November 9. Governments elsewhere are pursuing their own sovereign alternatives too, with the European Union’s IRIS² constellation targeting 2029.
36Kr sets out three links in the chain that Chinese low-orbit constellations face as the year-end node approaches: satellites, users and revenue.
Frequently Asked Questions
Which rockets can carry Qianfan satellites?
A technology analyst at a large South China brokerage, whom neither outlet names, told The Economic Observer in reporting carried by 36Kr that in the past only a few Chinese models such as the Long March 6A and Long March 8 could launch 18 Qianfan satellites at a time, and that those rockets also have to absorb launch tasks for other constellations. The same analyst said the Long March 6A, the Long March 8 series and the Lijian-2 can all undertake the constellation’s remaining launches this year.
Does a satellite count as part of the Qianfan network as soon as it reaches orbit?
No. 36Kr reports that after satellites enter orbit they must go through orbit phase adjustment and in-orbit testing, and are only incorporated into the network after acceptance.
How many satellites is China launching overall?
The unnamed brokerage analyst cited by 36Kr estimates the number of satellites launched in China this year is between 400 and 500, and expects that to reach 800 to 1,000 next year. The analyst summed up the position as “The demand is certain, and the gap is obvious.”
Why is Qianfan sometimes called SpaceSail or the G60 Starlink project?
The constellation’s Chinese name, 千帆, translates as “thousand sails.” Its operator, Shanghai Yuanxin Satellite Technology Co., Ltd., uses SpaceSail as its English-language name in dealings abroad, and the programme is also known as the G60 Starlink project after the Shanghai technology corridor where it was incubated. The 36Kr report uses “Qianfan Constellation” throughout.













