News analysis. The orbital data, quotes and battlefield claims below are Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s reporting, attributed throughout. Passages labelled as analysis are Starlink News’s own reading of those facts, and the extra material on ITU rules and published Starlink pricing is sourced separately in the text.
Russia’s answer to Starlink is failing to climb to the orbit it was designed for, while the ground sites that support it are being struck by Ukraine, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported on 20 September 2026. The satellite internet programme, called Rassvet and built by the Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440, now has two batches of non-test satellites in space, and RFE/RL reported that none of them has reached the planned altitude of 800 kilometres.
Key facts
- Bureau 1440 launched three Rassvet-1 test satellites in June 2023 and three Rassvet-2 satellites in May 2024, RFE/RL reported. The Rassvet-2 trio immediately reached the 800-kilometre target and successfully tested data transmission between each other and to Earth.
- A first batch of 16 Rassvet-3 satellites — no longer test versions — had been planned for 2025 but launched in March 2026. Dropped off at about 300 kilometres, they were meant to climb under their own power.
- Of that batch, one descended and burned up in the atmosphere, 13 are at 510 kilometres and two are at roughly 360 kilometres, according to the outlet.
- A second group of 16 launched in July faces similar issues: 13 are rising at comparable rates and three have fallen to 300 kilometres or less and may not end up operational.
- Much of the constellation currently sits at about 500 kilometres, RFE/RL reported.
- Bureau 1440 has filed two possible plans with the International Telecommunication Union, the UN agency that coordinates radio frequencies and satellite orbits: 292 satellites at 800 kilometres, or 1,350 satellites at 600 kilometres.
Why it matters
Low-orbiting satellites do not stay fixed above one point on the ground, RFE/RL explained, so each one offers only a short window of connectivity as it passes. A constellation needs enough satellites for one to always be overhead, and the outlet reported the current Rassvet fleet can only provide limited windows of communication to Russian forces in Ukraine.
That gap matters for anyone tracking rivals to Starlink’s global footprint. RFE/RL reported that Rassvet is due to begin commercial operations in 2027, that SpaceX has already produced and sold millions of Starlink terminals, that a fully deployed Rassvet will need its own ground-control infrastructure, and that there is still no public evidence of large-scale Rassvet terminal production.
Analysis: on those four facts taken together, the distance between the two systems is not only a question of how many satellites are in orbit. It is also a question of ground segment, terminal manufacturing and a published consumer offer — and on RFE/RL’s account Rassvet is unproven on all three, with a stated commercial start barely a year away.
What analysts say about the failures
Engine trouble, or a deliberately lower orbit?
RFE/RL, citing analysts it did not name, reported that some believe Bureau 1440 decided to keep the satellites permanently lower than planned because of engine problems. The same passage — RFE/RL’s own framing rather than a named expert’s assessment — added that a lower orbit is likely to somewhat reduce the area each satellite can cover, but does not mean the spacecraft are unfit for purpose. The outlet noted that SpaceX itself has lowered the orbital altitudes of many Starlink satellites over time, and that early Starlink prototypes reportedly failed at rates of up to 13 percent.
‘Very painful and probably close to unacceptable’
Space expert Anatoly Zak, who publishes the long-running reference site RussianSpaceWeb.com, told RFE/RL the level of failures is very painful and probably close to unacceptable. He also said the ascending satellites from the second launch are climbing rather chaotically at different speeds, with some moving in an orderly chain that others did not join.
Analysis: Zak’s description — inconsistent behaviour spread across a single production batch, rather than one satellite failing alone — is what would be expected if the problem lies in propulsion or control hardware common to the whole build, not in a single bad unit. Neither Zak nor RFE/RL identified a confirmed cause, and Bureau 1440 has not published one.
2027, 2028 or 2030?
On timing, Zak said the company is unlikely to hit its stated satellite count on schedule, and that setting unrealistic deadlines is common practice in the Russian space industry. Jakub Janovsky, an analyst at Oryx, an open-source outfit that tracks military equipment losses from visual evidence, told RFE/RL that in the most optimistic case Bureau 1440 might have enough satellites for nonstop communications over Ukraine by 2028, but delays could push that to 2030. Those two independent estimates sit one to three years beyond the official line RFE/RL said Russian officials cite most often: 292 satellites by the end of 2027.
What the ITU filings do and do not guarantee
The two filings RFE/RL described — 292 satellites at 800 kilometres, or 1,350 at 600 kilometres — show Bureau 1440 has kept more than one architecture on the table. They are not, however, a licence to operate anywhere. An ITU filing reserves frequencies and orbital parameters on paper; market access and landing rights are granted separately by each country’s own regulator.
They also come with a clock. Under the milestone regime in ITU Resolution 35, adopted at the 2019 World Radiocommunication Conference and published in that conference’s Final Acts (PDF), an operator of a non-geostationary system must place 10 percent of the notified constellation in orbit within two years of the end of its bringing-into-use period, 50 percent within five years and 100 percent within seven — or the filing is reduced to the number of satellites actually deployed. Readers who want the mechanics can see how spectrum and orbital filings are coordinated at the ITU.
Analysis: on the figures RFE/RL reported — 32 non-test satellites launched, one destroyed, several degrading — Bureau 1440’s real fleet is a small fraction of either paper plan. Starlink News has not seen Bureau 1440’s filing dates, so it is not possible to say from the public record where the company stands against its own milestone deadlines; what can be said is that the rule exists, and that missing it trims a filing down to the satellites actually flying.
Terminals could be the real bottleneck
There is still no public evidence of large-scale Rassvet terminal production, RFE/RL reported. Analysts told the outlet that terminals could become a key bottleneck: their phased-array antennas are expensive and Russia lacks the necessary component base, meaning some parts may have to come from China.
Because Rassvet satellites are less densely deployed and operate farther from Earth than Starlink’s, the outlet reported, Rassvet terminals may also need to be larger, heavier and more powerful — harder to supply in the numbers the Russian military would need, and less suitable for drones. RFE/RL reported that no Rassvet terminals have been found on Russian drones or missiles so far. For comparison on the other side of that equation, see our guide to Starlink’s own user terminals.
The price gap nobody has closed
SpaceX publishes its prices in the open on its Starlink residential order pages, where standard hardware kits are advertised in the low hundreds of dollars and residential service in the United States has typically run around 100 to 120 dollars a month, with sharp regional variation and periodic promotions. Bureau 1440 has published no consumer price at all — no hardware figure, no monthly plan, no service tiers — for a system RFE/RL reported is meant to go commercial in 2027.
What it means for Starlink availability
Starlink availability is decided country by country, by regulators rather than by orbits. SpaceX lists live coverage on its public availability map, which now shows service across more than 100 countries, territories and markets, with individual cells occasionally flagged sold out or waitlisted where capacity is tight. Russia is not among the markets where Starlink is authorised, and Russian officials have publicly opposed its use.
Availability has also been used as a lever in this war. RFE/RL reported that in February, Starlink cut off access for terminals inside Ukraine except for a whitelist approved by Ukraine’s Defence Ministry — a change in who may connect, not in where the satellites fly.
Analysis: that is the practical difference Rassvet is trying to erase. Starlink’s availability today is a commercial and regulatory question with published prices and a public map; Rassvet’s, on RFE/RL’s reporting, is still a question of whether the satellites will reach their intended altitude and whether terminals can be built at all.
Ground sites under attack
A fully deployed constellation will require its own ground-control infrastructure, RFE/RL reported, and those sites are being hit. Ukraine has repeatedly struck Russia’s Dubna satellite communications centre outside Moscow, and in August Ukrainian drones headed toward the Plesetsk cosmodrome ahead of a planned launch.
Zak told the outlet Plesetsk had previously been targeted around other launches, including the March launch of the first Rassvet-3 batch. Ukraine has also hit the Progress Rocket and Space Center, a plant involved in producing the Soyuz rockets used to carry the satellites. On RFE/RL’s account, the strikes touch all three links in the chain: the rockets that lift the satellites, the pad they lift from, and the ground stations that would command them once they are up.
Background: February’s Starlink cutoff
What changed in February
Until earlier this year, both Ukraine and Russia used Starlink for command-and-control and for flying explosive-laden drones, RFE/RL reported. In February, Starlink cut off access for terminals in Ukraine except for a whitelist approved by Ukraine’s Defence Ministry.
What Russia lost
Russia’s battlefield performance suffered immediately, the outlet reported: the number of assaults launched by Moscow’s forces declined, and a Pentagon report linked Russia’s loss of satellite communications to Ukraine recapturing hundreds of square kilometres of territory earlier this year. A prominent pro-invasion Telegram channel said the loss set Russian military communications back years, to wired internet, Wi-Fi and radio.
Janovsky told RFE/RL that most traditional military communications systems are designed primarily for voice, which makes them ill-suited to a battlefield where drone video feeds and other large data volumes move constantly. “That is precisely why Starlink and similar systems are virtually indispensable for the military,” he told the outlet. On his own timeline, the earliest Rassvet could provide nonstop coverage over Ukraine is 2028, and possibly 2030 — which, on Janovsky’s and Zak’s estimates as reported by RFE/RL, leaves the gap open well beyond this year.
Sourcing: orbital altitudes, launch dates, analyst quotes, ITU filing details and battlefield claims are as reported by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty on 20 September 2026 and are attributed in the text; Starlink News has not independently verified the altitude data. ITU milestone rules are drawn from Resolution 35 in the Final Acts of WRC-19, published by the ITU. Starlink pricing and availability figures are from SpaceX’s own public order and coverage pages and are subject to change. Bureau 1440 has not publicly responded to the findings; this report will be updated if it does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Are Rassvet terminals already being used on Russian drones?
No. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that Rassvet terminals have not been found on Russian drones or missiles as of yet. Analysts told the outlet that because Rassvet satellites are less densely deployed and operate farther from Earth than Starlink’s, its terminals may need to be larger, heavier and more powerful, making them less suitable for drones.
When do Russian officials say the constellation will be complete?
The figure most often cited by Russian officials is 292 satellites by the end of 2027, according to RFE/RL. Space expert Anatoly Zak, who publishes the long-running reference site RussianSpaceWeb.com, told the outlet Bureau 1440 is not likely to meet that target, and that setting unrealistic deadlines is a common practice in the Russian space industry. Oryx analyst Jakub Janovsky told RFE/RL that even in the most optimistic case, enough satellites for nonstop communications over Ukraine would not be in place before 2028, and delays could push that to 2030.
Why do internet satellites fly low instead of in geostationary orbit?
RFE/RL explained that the higher a satellite flies, the more ground it covers, but the longer data takes to travel up and back. Television satellites often sit in geostationary orbit about 36,000 kilometres up, fixed above one point, while satellites providing fast satellite internet fly relatively low to keep latency down.
Has Starlink itself lost satellites at similar rates?
RFE/RL reported that losing a certain percentage of satellites is normal, and that early Starlink prototypes reportedly suffered failure rates of up to 13 percent. The outlet also noted SpaceX has lowered the orbital altitudes of many of its satellites over time, so flying below a planned altitude does not by itself make a satellite unusable.
What does an ITU filing actually oblige Bureau 1440 to do?
An ITU filing reserves frequencies and orbital parameters on paper; it is not a licence to sell service in any country, which national regulators grant separately. Under the milestone rules in ITU Resolution 35, adopted at the 2019 World Radiocommunication Conference and published in the conference’s Final Acts, an operator of a non-geostationary system must deploy 10 percent of the notified constellation within two years of the end of its bringing-into-use period, 50 percent within five years and the full system within seven, or see its filing cut back to the number of satellites actually in orbit. RFE/RL reported Bureau 1440 has two filings on the table: 292 satellites at 800 kilometres, or 1,350 satellites at 600 kilometres.
What would Rassvet service cost compared with Starlink?
Bureau 1440 has not published consumer pricing for Rassvet hardware or service, and RFE/RL reported there is still no public evidence of large-scale terminal production. SpaceX, by contrast, publishes its prices openly on its order pages, where standard hardware kits are advertised in the low hundreds of dollars and residential plans in the United States have typically run around 100 to 120 dollars a month, with wide regional variation. Analysts told RFE/RL that the phased-array antennas Rassvet would need are expensive and that Russia lacks the component base to build them at scale, so cost — not just satellite count — is a live constraint.
Is Starlink available in Russia, and where is it available now?
Starlink has never been licensed for service in Russia, and Russian officials have publicly opposed its use there; RFE/RL reported that Russian forces nonetheless used Starlink terminals on the battlefield until access for terminals in Ukraine was restricted in February to a whitelist approved by Ukraine’s Defence Ministry. SpaceX lists availability country by country on its own coverage map, which now shows service in more than 100 countries, territories and markets, with some cells periodically marked sold out or waitlisted where capacity is tight.
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